Halting NATO’s Eastward Expansion Would Help Resolve U.S.-Russia Ukraine Crisis

Interview with Mel Goodman, a senior fellow at the Center for International Policy, former CIA analyst, conducted by Scott Harris

As the buildup of up to 100,000 Russian troops along the Ukraine-Russian border continues to increase tensions and fear of war, U.S. President Joe Biden and Russian president Vladimir Putin had a nearly one hour conversation on Dec. 30.  After the call Biden said he had warned Putin that if he makes any military incursions into Ukraine, the U.S. will impose severe sanctions and increase America’s presence in Europe. In a subsequent call with Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky on Jan. 2, Biden said that Washington and its allies would “respond decisively” if Russia were to invade Ukraine.

For it’s part, Moscow is demanding a ban on Ukraine entering the NATO military alliance, and a limit to the deployment of troops and weapons to NATO’s eastern flank, in effect returning NATO forces to where they were stationed in 1997, before the alliance undertook an eastward expansion.

Between The Lines’ Scott Harris spoke with Mel Goodman, a senior fellow at the Center for International Policy and an adjunct professor of international relations at Johns Hopkins University.  From 1966 through 1986 Goodman served as a senior analyst with the CIA and the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Here, he examines post-cold war history to better understand the current rise in tensions along the Ukraine border, while also assessing US corporate media’s coverage of the crisis.

MEL GOODMAN: I think Putin has made it clear what his position is. He’s not going to invade Ukraine. He doesn’t want a larger war with Ukraine. These people who are talking about Putin wanting to reestablish the Soviet Union, that’s just blather. That doesn’t amount to anything, that’s not what Putin is looking for. So I don’t think he wants to use force in any massive way.

He’s a gradualist anyway. When he’s used force, it’s always been at a low risk situation. In the summer of 2008 against Georgia, 2014 with regard to Crimea and even the Syrian operation that started about 2015. That was after the United States made it clear we wanted nothing to do with Syria. Obama sent that message, and so did Donald Trump. But to invade Ukraine, you’re talking about a war they could win on one level, but then they’d be stuck with an insurgency and guerrilla action.

Putin, I don’t think, can afford that. So it’s up to the United States to recognize two things. One, they have to come up with an idea. So far, all Biden has talked about is decisive support for Ukraine. He said that to Zelensky in the telephone meeting yesterday.

And the other thing that I don’t know if we’re capable of doing it, but at some point we have to acknowledge that we’re guilty of a betrayal. We made a commitment, a verbal commitment, and the Russians know this and and I interviewed the Secretary of State James Baker, and I interviewed Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, and they both said the same thing. Baker told Shevardnadze in 1990, when Germany was marching toward reunification — but there were 380,000 Soviet troops in East Germany — Baker told Shevardnadze and George H.W. Bush told Gorbachev, If you get out of East Germany, we will not leapfrog. That’s the word Baker used. We will not leapfrog over East Germany to go into Eastern Europe.

That’s exactly what Bill Clinton did in the 1990s, when he brought in several East European states that were part of the Warsaw Pact.

George W. Bush made it worse. He brought in three former Soviet republics, the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. And now I think Putin is in a situation where the United States is playing these games. We’re the one saying, “Oh, we’re not basing troops in Ukraine. These aren’t permanent troops. We’re just rotating troops.”

And I think he has basically said, “Enough is enough.” He wants some commitment, some guarantee. He’s asking that it be in writing. We’re not going to put anything in writing. But I think it’s time to say we’re not going to expand NATO any further.

We’ve already gone too far with NATO. NATO now exists with 30 members. That means we have security commitments to 29 nations, including the most recent nation to join, North Macedonia, of all places. And if we’re ever going to get back to a diplomatic dialogue with Putin, which is important on nuclear matters, on climate matters, on COVID matters or international terrorism matters where there’s general agreement on all these issues, we’ve got to move the Ukraine issue aside.

SCOTT HARRIS: Mel, I wanted to ask you about what are the forces at work here that seem to be chomping at the bit for a new Cold War or to escalate the Cold War that’s been simmering for some time now? We’re talking about the defense contractors, our members of Congress increasing the Pentagon budget year after year after year. Is there some agenda there of the sort of critical mass of the powerful in our country who want to see a Cold War escalate.

MEL GOODMAN: Well, clearly if you look at Eisenhower’s formulation, his original formulation, military, industrial, congressional complex, he didn’t use the word congressional, but it was in his speech. He wrote it in with his own hand into the draft that he was given, and he told his brother, Milton, that I really think that’s the problem. It’s the Congress.

And if you look at this vote that just took place over the defense budget, a $770 billion defense budget. And when you add in all the various agencies that contributed to defense, you’re talking about a budget of $1.2 trillion more than the rest of the world spends on defense, for that matter.

So this is one of the few areas in this country, and there are very few where you can get a bipartisan agreement. Then you throw in the press, you throw in people like David Sanger of The New York Times, Michael Crowley of the New York Times, The Washington Post editorial pages on Ukraine, people like David Ignatius, who ran a column the other day. He’s always been an apologist for the CIA, but this was basically a column that had to be written for him by the CIA. They’ve talked about all of these special covert, clandestine things we can do for Ukraine after the Russians attack. We don’t want the Russians to attack.

Again, the emphasis should be on the position adage, you know, “First, do no harm.” But we need to sort of pull back, deconflict from these areas where we shouldn’t be facing the Russians in any kind of military confrontation. And to be doing this over Ukraine, given the sensitivity of Russia of its borders, Ukraine — that was the path Napoleon Bonaparte used to invade. That was the path that Adolf Hitler used to invade. We know about their sensitivity to their borders.

And stop for a minute. Think of what if the Russians were flying Tu-95 bombers in the Gulf of Mexico or trying to lobby Mexico or Canada to join a military alliance with Russia and a Russian state that’s already in a quasi-alliance with China in part because of U.S. obstruction and U.S. opposition?

So I mentioned earlier about the need for the big ideas. We have to do some big thinking, some new thinking, have a genuine strategic review of American interests. What the people can do is start badgering your congressmen.

For more information, visit Mel Goodman’s website at melvingoodman.com and the Center for International Policy at internationalpolicy.org.

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